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Bio-Ethics from Image of God and Soul

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Abstract

Faced with the near unanimity of biblical anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck & Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1964–1976; VanGemeren, 1997), I propose an analysis of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1) "image of God" and (2) "soul." This approach results in a *functionalism*, which I call a *multi-faceted unity*. I propose to extend these biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics for implications. This approach is in contrast to some Christian bio-ethicists who start from the field of philosophy or biology and tack some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters of their view.

(1) Image of God means "a representation of God" showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974, pp. 160-161; *Tell Fekheriye inscription* 1, 12, 15–16; 4Q504 fragment 8, lines 4–6). God sets the purpose of His image to finitely rule under God's sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play god in bio-ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9).

This legitimates humans attempting prevention and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests (for example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of crops, genetically modified food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, AID, *in vitro*-fertilization, stem cell treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such an image of God concept identifies the theoretically permissible even though I recognize methodologically ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper bring certain restrictions.

In ruling the creation, anything is permitted provided it: (a) Is not excluded by God's command (Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Fits within God's design parameters, and is (c) actively engaged in for the Lord's glory (Romans 14:6–12). (d) Helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e) Fits within an affirming conscience, rather than violating one's conscience (a New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).

(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic meaning of "complete living and willing being" in a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul means that animals have certain privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.

Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalms 51:5; 139:13–15; Revelation 6:9).

Keywords

Biblical anthropology, Biblical view of human, Bio-ethics biblically, Image of God, Soul, Life, Person

Introduction

Bio-ethics as a field is dominated by philosophers and biologists using philosophical assumptions and categories. Since God created humans and provided a revelational description of us, this biblicism should reframe our conceptuality of humanity so as to fund bio-ethics from biblical thought forms, from start to finish. I propose to present an analysis of the words and concepts articulated in Old and New Testament literature that address the nature of a human. The conclusions presented from this analysis will be used to make a presentation of an integrated model of a human. I propose to then extend these biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics to unpack their bio-ethical implications.

Following this approach results in a *functionalism* (because of the redundant descriptions of wholistic humanity in the model), which I call a *multi-faceted unity* (of: image of God, soul, spirit, body, heart, mind, will, and conscience). However, the concreteness of especially Hebrew descriptive words could also be appealed to in claiming this model as an ontological model because it is describing the way we are from the biblical perspective, and so we should think about ourselves in this manner (Kennard, 1992). This means that this view should be thought as ontological and functionalist both, even though this is a novel way for philosophy to conceive of humanity. However, part of the point of this paper is to call philosophy and other human disciplines back to being reconfigured by the Word of God and biblical theology.

For example, within Christendom there are many

views of the nature of the human being. Among the most prominent are two views rooted in Platonism which have had long-standing traditions in Christianity. Dichotomists, following the *Epistle to Diognetus* (1964), make a distinction between the material and immaterial parts of a human, reflective of Plato's soul and body concepts. Theologians adhering to this view argue that soul and spirit are used interchangeably, whereas trichotomists, following Justin Martyr, point out that soul and spirit are distinct (Justin Martyr, 1949, *Apol.* 1.29). Such a trichotomy view is reflective of the neo-platonic trichotomy view of: spirit, soul, and body. In the twentieth century, additional views of humanity emerged including advocates of a holistic model. For example, one holistic model in the wake of Gestalt psychology maintains that the person is greater than the sum of his parts.

In contrast to this, biologists define humans either by comparison to animal properties and traits, or if they are Christians through a devotional lens of Jesus' disciples. For example, Institute for Creation Research biologist Daniel Criswell defined humans and proposed an ethic that identified that the core trait of humanity was to be a servant in the pattern of: (1) a non-alpha male from a herd or pack and (2) Jesus' disciple (Criswell, 2006, pp. 1–4). With the proliferation of widely divergent views there is a real danger of the disciplines of ethics and theology fragmenting into different Wittgensteinian language games unable to meaningfully communicate between them. Is such a postmodern option a way to leave this discipline? How should a wise Christian choose among all these views of humanness? To be sure, whatever model one chooses, it brings with it a worldview which is indebted to the philosophy upon which it is built. The author rejects bio-ethics built within these alternative world views as significantly flawed, for they will insulate the advocate from arriving at a consistent biblicism.

My approach is in contrast to the perspectives provided by philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and biology. Those disciplines give answers consistent with their worldviews and the methodologies dominant in these approaches. If an evangelical is working in these disciplines, often the extent of Christian integration is hanging a few biblical proof texts on the rafters. When Christians extend their bilingual beliefs from these disciplines into the field of bio-ethics then they become a parody of Star Trek: timidly going where everyone has gone before.

The author suggests instead using the approach of the biblical theology movement, that a Christian functional model of humanity start first with the biblical text and then work out the implications for bio-ethics. In the second half of the twentieth century within the descriptive biblical theology movement a model of the human being as a multifaceted unity gained dominance in the discipline. The near unanimity of biblical theologians embracing this model can be seen by the treatment in the theological wordbooks (Botterweck & Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) and by the scholarly descriptions of humanity from specialized biblical theologies (Dunn, 1998, pp. 51–78; Wolff, 1974), which corroborate the word studies of this paper. This near unanimity was bemoaned in the open question time and in the paper by Jeffrey Boyd at the Wheaton Theology Conference in 1997 focusing on the integration of psychology and theology. At this conference, Kennard and Holmes championed this near unanimous view as a framework for integrating psychology and theology (Kennard & Holmes, 1997). Boyd's concern was the loss of spirituality as behaviorists reduce humans to programmed matter in appeals to a wholistic view of soul. These descriptive biblical theologians are not arguing for what some behaviorists claim, for the behaviorists selectively appeal to a small part of biblical theology research to support their behaviorist agenda. So, Boyd's concern should be alleviated by the profound degree of spirituality retained within the view presented here.

Faced with a variety of psychological, philosophical and theological models, and the near unanimity of biblical anthropology among descriptive biblical theology, how is the Christian to understand the nature of humanness? I propose to follow the biblical theologians through an analysis of the words and concepts articulated in Old Testament and New Testament literature that address the nature of a human. The conclusions presented from this analysis will be used to make a presentation of an integrated model of a human. I propose to then extend these biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics to unpack their bio-ethical implications.

This method provides biblical grounding and thought forms to warrant the design and revealed framework for bio-ethics. From this approach we can with real warrant, boldly go where few have gone before, because God leads the narrow route through the galaxy of bio-ethical issues. The focus of this paper will be on the ethical issues that emerge from a biblical anthropology of image of God and soul.

Image of God

A range of traditional options identify how several theologies understand humans to be made *in* the image of God. For example, Irenaeus proposed "image of God" to describe reason and free will, while "likeness of God" he identified as the supernatural endowment through the Spirit (Irenaeus, 1995, 3.23.5 and 5.6.1).

Aquinas follows Irenaeus view identifying the *imago dei* as retained at the Fall but the likeness is lost at the Fall (Aquinas, 1952, 1.93.4). In contrast, Martin Luther and John Calvin identified "image of God" as identical to "likeness of God" in that both affirm the ability to reason and original righteousness (Calvin, n.d., 1:1; Luther, 1958, 1: 60–62). Both Reformers saw these qualities as significantly marred through the Fall. Others followed their lead, such as Emil Brunner who took "image of God" as a symbol for "moral uprightness or righteousness of God" (Brunner, 1947, p. 388). In contrast, Karl Barth identified "image of God" is essentially the relationality of humans that permits relationship with God and fellow humans after the pattern of the divine relationships within the Trinity (Barth, 1936–1969, 3/2:196). Additionally, Thomas Torrance and G. C. Berkouwer identify "image of God" as "the focal point in the interrelationships between God and the universe" (Berkouwer, 1962, pp. 87–89, 179, 197–198; Torrance, 1981, p. 129). None of these traditional views are how the Bible or the descriptive biblical theology movement uses the term of "image of God."

The concept of humankind as the "image of God" is first introduced in the creation account in Genesis. As God creates man, He formulates an image of Himself (Genesis 1:26–28). The words for "image" (*ṣlmnw*/ צֶלֶם מנו, εἰκόνα) and "likeness" (*dmtnw*/ דְּמוּתֵנוּ, ὁμοίωσιν state that characteristics attributed to God in this passage are reflected in a human. There is no distinction between the two words; they are totally interchangeable (Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 1:192). In this Genesis 1 instance, Eugene Merrill clarifies that the בְּ ("in") is best understood as the "*beth* of identity" and parallel to the כְּ ("according to") in indicating functionality (Alexander & Baker, 2003, pp. 443–444). That is, "image and likeness of God" mean that humans function in the role as *representation* and *representative* of God.

This account introduces humans as a *representation of God* on earth. In the ancient Near East, kings would erect images of themselves indicating regions that were appropriately within their domain. For example, Ramesses II had his image hewn out of rock at the mouth of the *nahr el-kelb* on the Mediterranean north of Beirut, indicating he ruled this area (*Tell Fekheriye inscription* 1, 12, 15–16 in Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137; 4Q504 fragment 8, lines 4–6 in Wise, Abegg, & Cook, 2005, p. 526; VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969–970; Wolff, 1974, pp. 160–161). Therefore, as God's image, man indicates by his very presence that God rules the earth. This emphasis of the greatness of God's creative and sovereign power reflects the emphasis of the first literary unit (Genesis 1:1–2:3) as it polemics other ancient Near East cosmologies.

Image of God indicates humans are God's representative on earth; man pictures God as both sovereign ruler and creator (Alexander & Baker, 2003, pp. 442, 444–445; Apocrypha: *Sir.* 17.3–4; *Wis.* 2.23; Brown, 1975, 2:287; Kittel & Friedrich, 1964–76, 2:392; Freedman & Simon, 1977: *Gen. Rab.* 8.10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 2:768; Neusner, 1988: b.*Sanh.* 38b; *m 'Abot* 3.14; *b.Meg.* 9a; 28a; VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969; von Rad, 1962, 1:146; Wolff, 1974, pp. 159–165;). Thus, images of God are designed by God to rule the creation (Genesis 1:26). To help facilitate this ruling, the images of God are blessed to both reproduce themselves and thereby facilitate this ruling of the created order (Genesis 1:28). "Filling the earth" connects these two themes, showing the extent of man's procreative power and making it possible for him to rule. Creation and rule require a male and a female in the human realm. Persons are individually God's image and as a married pair the couple is God's image. Not that relationality is meant by image but that individually we humans contribute toward ruling and that married pairs also contribute toward ruling (being fruitful, multiplying to fill the earth so subduing and ruling can occur). God's image as one, yet plural, hints at the majestic creator character of Elohim (Kennard, 2002, pp. 87–89). From the chaotic images of formlessness that begin the passage, God shows his goodness through purposefully designing creation and then humans in His image. Humans are to bring this creation under our control, which would include remaking it purposefully for the ends we think are best under our stewardship to God.

Genesis goes on to develop the idea that God's image included being His son, fitted by a loving Father with an appropriate situation, work, life and marriage (Genesis 2:23–24; 5:1–3; Luke 3:38; Alexander & Baker, 2003, pp. 442; *Instruction of Merikare* 1.106 in Prichard, 1969, pp. 414–418). The few additional references to humans as God's image indicate that this image continues beyond the fall (Genesis 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9) though dragged through futility and death as a result of sin.

In contrast to a creation-based view of human as image of God, the image of Christ is a future representation of Christian humans in their glorification. Jesus Christ in His incarnation comes in the image of God, but upon completing His work, He was highly exalted (2 Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 10:15; Philippians 2:6–11). As a result, the Christian is not merely having his damaged image of God repaired but is also being made into a more exalted image of the glorified Son of God (Romans 8:29–30; 1 Corinthians 15:49; 2 Corinthians 3:18; 4:4; Philippians 3:21). In fact, the Christian's fallen condition will be transformed into a higher state than that of Adam before the fall.

The concept of "image of God" has implications for the individual as he lives out life. Terms such as sovereignty are associated with the concept and indicate the responsibility the first human inhabitants were given for the world in which they lived. The terms for "subdue" and "rule" כִּבְשֻׁהָ וּרְדוּ are very forceful, encouraging utilization and dominance of the creation by humans (Genesis 1:26, 28). Such forceful words, are used elsewhere in instances of conquest and rape, implying that the created world will resist some of our rule (Leviticus 26:17; Numbers 32:22, 29; Nehemiah 5:5; Jeremiah 34:11, 16; Genesis 3:1–5 shows first resistance). This is especially the case once the creation is subjected to futility by the oracle of judgment in response to the fall of humans (Genesis 3:14–19; Romans 8:20). However, humans are to provide the structures and guidelines for co-existing and engaging with their natural environment. In this sense, our responsibility to nature included those encompassed by that of a fiduciary or curator (Genesis 2:15–19). The original inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos and promote an environment in which the needs of all are observed. Humans are to nurture nature. Both before the Fall and after the Fall, the original inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos and promote an environment in which the needs of all are observed. This is evident in the naming, organizing and agricultural work humans were to accomplish. This structure provided an atmosphere in which the inherent potential of both human beings and nature itself could be actualized. As images and sons of God, humans are to play god in bio-ethics, not be God (the Sovereign), but do miniature acts of sovereignty within the stewardship which has been delegated to us by the Sovereign God. In the same way as our kids play house and army men, so in our stewardship we are to play god in bringing control to the area of biology.

Anything that is not biblically excluded, we have free range to conceptually plan and explore for the potential gain that we can bring to the creation. Such subduing control does not control all factors for God remains sovereign over our stewardship under Him. The causalities are best understood as a divine-human compatibilism in which both God and humans choose and implement everything that comes to pass (Genesis 4:1; Acts 2:23; Kennard, 2002, pp. 135–166, 185–204). Thus we do not violate God's sovereignty by our humanly responsible attempts to subdue and rule the creation. This legitimates humans attempting prevention and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests (for example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in child-birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of crops, genetically modified food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, AID, *in vitro*-fertilization (especially if all fertilized eggs are used to try to implant), stem cell treatment, gene therapy, and reproductive cloning (Cole-Turner, 1997, pp. 149–151). Such an image of God concept identifies the theoretically permissible even though I recognize methodologically ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper bring certain restrictions. For example, I recognize that embryonic stem cell research should not destroy the embryo (because it is life) but may be possible without such destruction, however pragmatically may not be therapeutically productive unless the problem of tumor production is significantly diminished. Furthermore, a clone does not become a substitute for a person, nor should be insurance for a person (contrary to the movie, *The Island*), but such a clone is a whole new image of God. That is, cloning only provides a biological duplicate to progress through a developmental process that will at least in some respect be different from the original. Nature provides possibilities, whereas nurture realizes some of those possibilities.

Thus genetic determinism is too limited an idea to reflect what biblical divine-human compatibilism entails. In fact, with only 20,000–25,000 protein-coding genes this is probably too few to determine all aspects of our life and destiny (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2004, pp. 931–945). Furthermore, if one could methodologically develop filtering to recognize cystic fibrosis or Down syndrome, genetic therapy of the zygote would not be forcing genes upon the new individual (albeit, with parental consent) for these genes would be utilized in the early creation process making the new individual who he is in creation. Nurture, of course, would then develop the given of these genetic possibilities. Likewise, a clone and a genetically manipulated fertilized egg is a new image of God in a different situation than that of the original. This is evident in recognizing observable differences among identical twins who occupy the same womb. The nurturing environment will significantly affect the development of this new image of God. The cloned or genetically aided image of God will live life within the same stewardship as other images of God: responsible, accountable, answerable, praised or judged.

Of course, the fact that we can and should explore ways of controlling the creation does not guarantee funding or ease in obtaining resources. The utility of greater gain for the greater good would argue for the public funding to pursue those health needs which would accomplish the most societal good. Communal oversight helps to: (1) alleviate potential problems, (2) limit violating societal conscience, and (3) rule creation responsibly. For example, in the United States genetically modified food is not much of an issue probably because of the oversight brought about

by the Food and Drug Administration ("Talk of the Nation: Science Friday," 2005). This was aided by the FDA defining genetically modified food as "essentially equivalent" to the natural. Perhaps something like the FDA could help relieve the international fears as well. Furthermore, personal funding could be utilized to support those concerns which an individual is passionate about. Provided resources and means were available, such expressions of control are to be encouraged. As images of God, we each have responsibility to reason and obtain consent of the responsible parties in pursuing our control of part of the creation. Of course, the obtaining of resources does not provide license to violate ethics (for example, abortion to obtain stem cells will be shown to be a violation of biblical ethics).

To facilitate this control of the creation, human beings possess cognitive abilities that enable self-reflective thought and the ability to assess, learn from past experience, anticipate future contingencies, and to choose purposefully to accomplish desired ends (Kennard, 1999, pp. 35–70). These capacities make him uniquely qualified for the task of stewardship. For example, Adam was given the responsibility of naming the creatures in the garden and identifying a partner for himself (Genesis 2:20). The roles and responsibilities inherent within humanness, such as cultivation and care, suggest that the truly human individual comprehends the ecological balance of nature and interacts with it in a manner that respects the place of all things created. This individual understands that the project of true humanness is increased when the potential of all nature is encouraged. Thus to thwart the actualization of the least of created things hinders the peace (*shalom*) intended for all.

In ruling the creation, anything is permitted provided it is: (1) Not excluded by God's command, like judging someone with a different opinion or practice (Romans 14:3–10, 13). That is, don't disobey God or He could judge you (Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (2) Anything is permitted provided it fits within the priority of the design parameters and is (3) actively engaged in for the Lord's glory (Romans 14:6–12). (4) Anything wise is permitted, in that it helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (5) Anything is permitted that fits within an affirming conscience, rather than violating one's conscience (a New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).

To facilitate the image of God's rule of the creation God provides blessings of: fruitfulness, to fill the earth, to subdue the earth, and to rule the earth (Genesis 1:26–30, the construction in Genesis 1:28 "God blessed them and said …" identifies the content of the blessing using a narrative connecter *waw* consecutive as the author repeatedly uses throughout chapter 1 and elsewhere in Genesis; 8:20–9:17). Ruling the earth is both the design goal for we humans and a blessing from God (Genesis 1:26, 28). These elements of blessing are softer than commands because they are within the genre of blessing, which the Blesser, God grounds (Genesis 2:3; 5:2; 9:1; 12:2–3). *Blessing entails a relationship of privilege, mostly guaranteed by the blesser in relationship, which in this case is God.* In this creation context God's statement accomplishes what it says, so these blessings are guaranteed. God's speech in the first literary unit (Genesis 1–2:4) accomplishes His statement to make it so, even though He uses imperatives in these statements to render in reality: light, separation, waters, lights and swarms (Genesis 1:3, 6, 9, 14, 20). Few would conjecture that the imperative in each of these divine statements renders light or water culpable for their existence, so God incorporates divine statements using imperatives in this creation account as statements of His guaranteeing the creation order. However, that does not guarantee that these spoken creations (light, vegetation, and animals) are everywhere, nor does it guarantee all humans will be procreatively fruitful. Blessing makes it generically realizable for the human race, but not necessarily specifically realizable for everyone (Genesis 1:22, 28); some may be infertile without being culpable for sin concerning this. God makes us fruitful, and so corporately we fill the earth. God enables us to subdue, so we can rule.

Though these are God grounded corporate blessings there is corporate culpability for involvement indicated through the use of imperatives to moral beings. The use of plural Hebrew Qal imperatives for all five blessings "Be fruitful, multiply, fill, subdue, and rule," and the LXX (Septuagint) having "be fruitful and multiply" as present imperatives shows the group of humans should as a group participate within the corporate blessing which God provides. However, the LXX use of "fill, subdue and rule" as aorist indicatives softens involvement with these statements of God's guaranteeing the design plan in this text. Perhaps, the second century BC LXX perspective of the harm accomplished against others through the multiple captivities and dispersions diminishes its obligation when compared to the Mosaic context of the MT.

No one is personally culpable if he does not avail himself to all blessings. For example, Jesus had the blessing of having angel protection (Matthew 4:6), but that is no cause for foolish choices. Jesus was not culpable for not availing himself with all these potential blessings.

God's blessings can change. For example, the blessing of a vegetarian diet changed to include meat at the Noahic Covenant (Genesis 1:29–30; 9:2–4).

While God's corporate blessings in themselves are not themselves ethically binding for individuals.

However, they can have restrictions within them, so there may be aspects of responsibility. When there is individual culpability, it is usually spelled out with its gain or consequences. For example, gain is apparent in that the male and female within image of God fosters fruitfulness (Genesis 1:27–28). This would have obvious ethical implications for heterosexual marriage. Likewise, the Noahic Covenant stipulation against murder is immersed within an *inclusio* of blessing, and provided with the teeth of capital punishment to enforce its mandate (Genesis 9:1–7). As a blessing, fruitfulness to fill is only reiterated when the population is small, showing God's insistence on individuals participation in procreation is only essential when the population is small (Genesis 1:28; 9:1, 7).

So blessing is contextually dependent. Within the specific context of family protection and gain from labor, children are a blessing from the Lord (Psalms 127:1–5). This psalm does not declare kids to be a blessing in all contexts. For example, a destructive foolish son is not a blessing (Proverbs 10:1; 30:11–14). So the context of one's child's life virtues and vices indicates whether a specific child is a blessing for his parents or not.

This creation pattern does not legitimate natural rights or natural law, but rather God provides the privilege of *blessings in responsible relationship*. We as images of God can not insist on a right of the status of what we are. That is, an infertile lady can't insist that God make her fruitful. The whole ethical approach that defends natural rights or natural law is far more indebted to Stoicism, Aristotle, Aquinas and Jefferson than to the biblical text. Now don't misunderstand me, there may be truth through natural rights and it may be helpful in bilingual communication to other worldviews to use natural rights arguments, but natural rights and law are not the biblical theology framework within which God creates, elects, and provides. That is, we images of God must frame our ethic by God's fiat and thus fit into His biblically revealed framework for our stewardship. These creation frameworks especially develop blessings of: fruitfulness, to fill the earth, to subdue the earth, and to rule the earth (Genesis 1:26–30; 8:20–9:17). Amid these blessings is the stewardship with ethical admonitions of: (1) cultivating and keeping the garden and then the earth (which has ramifications for development, recycling, and retention of resources), (2) enjoying the freedom and abundant resources, and (3) don't disobey God or He can judge (Genesis 2: 15–17; 3:17–19; 8:20–9:17). These ethical frameworks have huge ethical ramifications.

Let us briefly explore fruitfulness to fill the earth. This blessing is affirmed whenever the population is low, so it is a critical admonition in those instances (Genesis 1:28; 9:1, 7). Obviously, on an individual level fertility can be foregone as a human wishes to pursue a noble goal, like a single life of ministry to Christ (for example, 1 Corinthians 7). Presumably, this would also legitimate family planning so that ministry and the quality of child rearing could also be facilitated. This is because sexuality is not just for procreation but also includes pleasure and cultivating a marriage relationship within its purposes (Genesis 2:23–24; 26:8; Proverbs 30:18–19; SS. 5:1). The spilling of Onan's seed is wrong because he did not fulfill his obligation to his sister-in-law/wife in levirate marriage (which is designed to raise up a family heir for the land [a quality of life concern]); it is not a judgment on birth control (Genesis 38: 8–10; Deuteronomy 25:5–10). This is corroborated by *Coitus interuptus* being permitted by second Temple rabbi Eliezer (*b. Yebam.* 34b; *t. Nid.* 2.6; Feldman, 1968, p. 187). However, as a blessing, fertility can not be insisted upon as a right. Unfortunately, some will be infertile, and there is no sin in this, even if it is repeatedly a condition of pain throughout the Bible and life. Likewise, there is no sin in attempting to comply with God's broad blessing to become fertile, provided it is through ethical means. Fertility can be accomplished by a range of enablement's of each spouse (medication, surgery, AID, *invitro*-fertilization, egg donation, cloning) and by adoption from another, as well. Additionally, surrogacy is theoretically moral, but may be practically difficult to facilitate but it might be possible to find a person so generous and giving of themselves as to carry a baby to term for the purpose of the intended couple to adopt and raise him as their own, but it has been done in this generous manner. Of course, in a polygamous situation fertility through one wife can diminish some felt need of infertility of the other, but it rarely meets the psychological need of the infertile wife and will likely raise other problems since monogamy is God's design and humans are sinful, and of course in many nations polygamy is illegal (for example, Genesis 2:24; 16:1–16; 21:8–21; 29:15–30:24; 1 Samuel 1:2–28). Sometimes God will even please the infertile couple with fertility in spite of their fertility treatment (for example, Genesis 30). On this issue, like other infirmed conditions, God promises to heal the infertile condition in the everlasting Kingdom (Isaiah 54:1–3).

On the other side of the fertility issue, it would be permitted for a society commitment to limit population, as in China, because they corporately consider that they have "filled" that region of the globe. That is, then fruitfulness enables multiplying to a full condition through which subduing and ruling can be accomplished. Such control that an image of God can bring subdues the creation to comply with the blessings of God. However, if procreative

activity hinders human attempts to rule the creation, procreation as a blessing can be limited to facilitate the greater purpose and blessing designed for the image of God, that of ruling the creation (Genesis 1:26 purpose over blessing in 1:28 to facilitate purpose).

Conclusion

Image of God means "a representation of God" showing that God rules here and as a term "image of God" identifies that we humans should rule in the creation. God sets the purpose of His image to finitely rule under God's sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play god in bio-ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9).

Soul

While "image of God" wonderfully elevates humanity above the rest of creation, soul connects a human with the rest of the creation. That is, the language of the Genesis account identifies that animals and humans *are* living souls (Botterweck, & Ringgren, 1974–2006, 9:510–516; Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 2:589–591; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:620, 639–640, 648–649, 653; VanGemeren, 1997, 3:133). The animals pre-modernly described as souls are non-microbial animals (fish, foul, insect, reptile, amphibian, and mammal). No biblical text discusses the microbial. Soul has a holistic connotation in that it signifies a *complete living being* (Botterweck & Ringgren; Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998, pp. 22, 178, 186; Dunn, 1998, pp. 76–78; Harris, Archer & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974; McKenzie, 1965, p. 839; Rahner & Vorgrimler, 1965, pp. 442–443; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974, pp. 24–25; 11QTemple 51.19; 54.20; 61.12; 1QS 11.13; CD 12.11-12; 1QH 2.2, 24; 3.6; 5.17–18; 9.18; 15.16). The words for soul, *nephesh* (*npš*/נֶפֶשׁ) in the Hebrew and *psyche* (ψυχήν) in the Greek, have developed from the idea of breath to mean the whole person who both breathes and desires, lives and moves (Exodus 23:12; Deuteronomy 12:12; Brown, 1974, vol. 3, pp. 676, 679). Very few biblical references develop "soul" as a part of a human (Dunn, 1998; Harris Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974; Pannenberg, 1985, p. 523; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974), and in those cases it refers to the throat or neck, the organ of breathing (Isaiah 51:23; Jeremiah 15:9; Luke 2:35; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:609, 618). In other places, soul stands in the place of a pronoun, indicating living persons (Psalms 54:4; Acts 2:41). At times soul is combined in a list with other descriptors of human to communicate that all of a person must be involved in a task such as loving God (Deuteronomy 6:4–5; Matthew 22:32; Acts 4:32; 1 Thessalonians 5:23).

Only rarely is there a verse like Hebrews 4:12 which indicates that the Word of God can separate between soul and spirit, suggesting the two concepts are not identical.

This biblical concept of soul is very different from the philosophical and traditional theological alternatives. For example, Tertullian followed the Stoics in conceiving of the human soul as corporeal, generated with the body (Tertullian, 1869–1870, p. 9). Plato reasons that the soul is an eternal form for each human which as eternal continues from a pre-incarnate existence to a post-incarnate afterlife, while our shadowy bodies are birthed and then decay (Plato, 1952, pp. 93, 124, 244–246, 763–764). While Origen followed Plato's view of soul (Origen, 1976, 2.9.6), Augustine modified the concept in the direction of neo-platonism, denying eternal pre-existence and affirming a created tripartite quality of each human soul to reflect the Trinity (Augustine, 1952, pp. 265, 360–361, 510, 561, 588). In contrast, Aristotle and Aquinas proposed a hylomorphic view in which the material human is formed as soul (Aristotle, 1952, pp. 177, 538, 559, 567, 600, 631, 642–645; Aquinas, 1952, pp. 14–15, 275–276, 365–367, 368–369, 378–379, 515). René Descartes proposed a radical form of substance dualism in which the soul is akin to a thinking substance that is the real person within the extended substance of body (Descartes, 1952, pp. 20, 135–136, 208–209). Karl Barth identifies that body and soul are a "concrete monism," both terms describing the unique and singular experience of the person (Barth, 1936–69, 3/2:393). None of these philosophical or traditional theological views captures the sense of the biblical text and the biblical theology movement on the wholistic human concept of soul as life or person.

A special contemporary challenge excludes the concept of soul from theological discussion by advocating humans as nonreductive physicalism. Murphy, Brown, and Anderson advocate a nonreductive physicalism that considers humans as a "whole complex function, both in society and in relation to God, which gives rise to 'higher' human capacities such as morality and spirituality" (Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998, p. 2, 25, 49–72, 99–148). Their view is better analyzed as affirming a full concept of body (which I agree with) because it actually explores the cognitive and religious capacities rooted in embodiement and genes, rather than the absence of the presence of soul. Their case for nonreductive physicalism excluding soul is merely to join Murphy in *assuming* that their case for embodiement excludes soul (perhaps on the basis of Ockham's razor, though this is never mentioned), but they marshal no evidence for that assumption. They merely assume their conclusion without relevant evidence. So nonreductive physicalism is no defeater

of soul, merely an affirmation of body. Such an *assumption that redundant analysis and causalities exclude each other* counters Murphy's own assumption and practice of granting "multiple causation" analyses elsewhere (Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Ellis, 1996, pp. 195–228). Such a commitment to "multiple causation" analysis is a commitment that biblical theology's multifaceted-unity hypothesis of humanity here and Murphy elsewhere share in common. Additionally, for purposes of informing bio-ethics (which is what this chapter is about), Murphy's nonreductive physicalism is a degenerative hypothesis, because she nowhere develops the concept when she discusses her broadly Christian ethic (Murphy & Ellis, 1996; Murphy, Kallenberg, & Nation, 1997). So if Murphy ignores nonreductive physicalism for discussions in bio-ethics, I will do the same. Furthermore, the Bible and the biblical theology movement develop "soul" as a meaningful concept, showing Murphy has different allegiances than inform this paper.

Biblically, soul can be likened to the self or person. This concept refers to the most basic or elemental aspect of the person. Thus, soul is the relationship of the person to himself and others on an ontological level. We should not define "person" in a Descartian or Lockian manner as *a self-aware individual* or in an Aristotelian manner as *having the capacity of self-assertion and self-manipulation*. This is most important in discussions of Trinity and Christology where the concept of person and nature must be clarified precisely. If nature is defined by the attributes of a being, cognition would be an attribute related to nature. With such a definition of nature, Lockian, Descartian, or Aristotilian definitions for "person" would render the Trinity into a contradictory concept, affirming three and one mental Beings simultaneously (Kennard, 2002, pp. 75–78). In the orthodox Trinitarian model, then person is defined by the following coherent manner: *an instance of a spiritual being as a moral end in itself, in relation to others*. In Trinity there are three persons ontologically and one Divine nature. It is the Divine nature that is omniscient. In Christology there are two natures (Divinity and humanity) and one person Jesus Christ. Chalcedon's decision identified Christ's Deity as omniscient, and humanity as limited and growing in knowledge. Thus person and nature are not the same thing, nor should they be confused. The divine persons are to be worshipped. Whereas, human, angelic and animal persons are to be respected to the level of their respective natures. That is, while both humans and animals are souls, only humans are images of God, thus humans are of a higher level of being than animals.

An additional side consequence of defining person in a Descartian, Lockian, or Aristotelian manner is that infantization and euthanization would be advocated. We should not define "person" in a Descartian or Lockian manner as *a self-aware individual* because neither a fetus, nor a newly born infant can be justified to be self-aware until months after birth. Likewise, neither should we define person in an Aristotelian manner as *having the capacity of self-assertion and self-manipulation* because such capacity does not develop until months after birth. Likewise in both definitions a coma victim or a victim of only brain-stem functioning would cease to be a person and thus could be disposed of as mere tissue. The orthodox Trinitarian definition of person protects against such infanticide and euthanasia.

On the authority of stipulations and blessings of the Noahic covenant: (1) no one should murder (or euthanize) a human person, (2) humans and animals who do murder (or euthanize) humans should forfeit their lives by societal fostered capital punishment, (3) humans can eat animals, but not while they are alive, and 4) humans should not eat the emblem of soul, the blood of the animal (Genesis 9:2–6; Acts 15:20, 29; Romans 13:4, 7). No governmental response should over-rule the Divinely designated stewardship and blessings that are set by God in relationship with humans. Therefore, it would be unethical to argue that humans have a moral right to die with dignity in either natural law or from constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy. Furthermore, there is no right to limit suffering, but as responsible agents in our stewardship under God, we can make attempts to diminish pain within suffering, especially when it is requested by the responsible agent or the sufferer. Quality of life concerns should not be used to over-rule the divinely sourced stewardship pressed upon the human race in toto requiring the communal obligation to the right to life.

Likewise, there should be a concern for animal privilege in a biblical view of soul. Animals are responsible agents and should be rewarded or punished appropriately to their level of personhood (Genesis 3:1, 13–15; 9:5–6; Exodus 21:28–29; Deuteronomy 25:4; Matthew 12:11–12; Luke 14:5; CD 10:15–11:18 and especially 11:13–14; 4Q 265; *Miscellaneous Roles* fragment 7, 1.6–9; *m. Besa* 3.4). However, animals are to be subdued and ruled by humans, and even eaten (Genesis 1:26–28; 9:2–4). Specifically, animals are available for bio-ethical experimentation and attempts to improve human conditions. Furthermore, it is ethical to use eggs to cultivate human vaccines. Drug, cloning and surgery experiments on animals are appropriate to develop treatments for humans. The bio-ethical concerns would urge against frivolous or needlessly painful or wasteful use of these animals, because they are souls, and thus persons.

To concretize this and to guarantee humans will not be accidentally injured, one is justified in spraying perfume in the eyes of bunnies.

Furthermore, in bio-ethics the origin of life is the origin of the soul and person. David considers that his inward parts (*klyty*/כִּלְיֹתָי meaning "kidneys" or the cognitive center of his being; Wolff, 1974, pp. 63–66) and bones were made by God in the womb of his mother (Psalms 139:13–15). The continuity before birth to growing up to adulthood is considered by David to continue to be himself. David considers that God has completely planned out his life before he had experienced any days of it. Eve recognizes that procreation includes the human intimate sexual activity *and* the divine aid to produce a human life (Genesis 4:1, 25). So no procreation is without divine and human effort to bring it about. David actually considers that he began in the heat of intimate sexual passion and knowledge (*'d'*/אֵד עָ *tmyd*/תָּמִיד and thus views himself as in the condition of sin from his parent's sexual deed on into his adulthood (Psalms 51:5; Campbell, 2003, pp. 122–124, 175–177). David as fetal soul is already immersed in the depravity of sin in the wake of the Fall. Thus, the biblical text describes the fetal condition in a pre-modern event oriented description as from the sex of conception through birth as a continuity of the person after birth, and attribute to the unborn personal characteristics (such as a sin condition) from the parental sexual intercourse on. Likewise, the unborn are even called by God before birth (Genesis 25:22–23; Judges 13:2–7; Isaiah 49:1, 5; Galatians 1:15).

Thus abortion is wrong either intentionally or unintentionally. Exodus 21:22–24 discusses a relevant legal case concerning the unintended consequences of striking a pregnant lady. In the striking, "her child" (*yldyh*/יְלָדֶיהָ) is made to "come out" (*yṣ'w*/יָצְאוּ) in a live birth. That is, *yṣ'w*/יָצְאוּ always refers to a live birth (Genesis 25:25–26; 38:28–30; Jeremiah 1:5; 26:18), unless it is accompanied by the word "death" (*mt*/מֵת, Numbers 12:12; Job 3:11). So, in this instance *yld*/יֶלֶד refers to a live child, not a miscarriage. There is another word for "still birth" in the context but it is not used in this instance (*škl*/שָׁכֵל, Exodus 23:26; Hosea 9:14). Therefore, the baby is born in Exodus 21:22 prematurely risking her life, so the judges need to decide on a fine for the striker, since he put the baby at risk in her pre-maturity. That is, if there is no further injury to baby or mother then the assessed fine is the extent of the punishment. However, if the mother or the baby have further injuries, then whatever that injury is will be legally meted out against the striker. If either the baby or the mother dies the abuser forfeits his life (Campbell, 2003, pp. 226–227; Exodus 21:23; *Middle Assyrian Laws* A 51–53 and *Laws Lipit-Ishtar,* Laws d–f in Roth, 1995, pp. 26–27). Both mother and fetus are treated in this passage as persons with legal rights. Therefore, it is bio-ethically wrong to abort a fetus for quality of life concerns and to intentionally use means that prevent fertilized eggs from being implanted (for example, use of intra-uterine device or RU486) and birthed. Which would mean that *in vitro*-fertilization would best be done without producing any more fertilized eggs than used to implant and extra fertilized eggs should be utilized with parental consent to help others attempt procreation. The fertilized eggs are not property, but persons and should not be treated as property. If the biological parents consider that they do not wish to make further attempts of implantation of eggs then these fertilized eggs should not be discarded, nor available for stem cell research in a manner that destroys them or treatment, but could be made available for infertile couples who could benefit by such adoptive egg donation. Furthermore, the fact that half of the normally fertilized eggs in the normal biological process do not implant, neither legitimizes abortion, nor frees humans from the responsibility to do what is reasonable to facilitate fertilized eggs from developing into fully functioning humans to the extent that we can. A simpler ethical strategy for *in vitro*-fertilization would be to only fertilize one egg per attempt at implantation, because it can side step this problem of actual human lives cut short by the choice of not trying for implantation.

Furthermore, a person as soul (*npš*/נֶפֶשׁ) wills, and feels hate, love, grief, joy, patience, fear, despair, bitterness and sympathy (Isaiah 1:14; Jeremiah 12:7; 13:17; Job 6:4; 30:25; Psalms 6:3; 35:9; 42:5; Proverbs 31:6). The continuing legacy of the living self is the soul. A person's emotions and cognitive ability may change as she digresses through illnesses like Alzheimer's or dementia or stroke or MS, or brain injury, however there is continuity of soul/person there. Finally, Revelation 6:9 identifies that the person as soul retains life beyond death. Further, in this afterlife, such debilitating illnesses are remedied, so that the after-life gets beyond these diminishments.

In an attempt to be bilingual and communicate philosophically to other worldviews, human personal life may be noticed biologically, to evidence this biblical model. (1) Humanness is noticed by the range of human DNA in an after conceived and before death condition (while normally 46 chromosomes, this permits the 45 chromosome condition of Turner's syndrome and the 47 chromosome condition of Down's syndrome to also be human). (2) Personal and (3) life can be noticed by the fusion of soul/life that biblically begins at conception. This personal life may be evidenced by noticing the congruence of the properties of growth (proceeding through a life cycle including effecting the change permitting only one sperm to penetrate the

fertilized egg, fusion of DNA with 46 chromosomes, and at least in some fertilized eggs the addition of a Y chromosome where it had not been there in the egg before fertilization), and perhaps self-replication on a cellular level. The condition of identical twins would also argue for life beginning at conception, when the twins are fertilized and the ovum split in two (without a sharing of common soul). Of course with implantation, there are further changes (stopping the woman's period), and metabolism (cellular and fetal) through the mother's blood stream. In this condition the fetus is not like an organ, because bodily organs do not eventually have a somewhat independent life like children can have. As the fetus goes through the life cycle it adds additional qualities which continue to increase until puberty (when the person can reproduce themself as a full person). So there is more evidence biologically for the ontological condition of life, as the fetus develops, is birthed and becomes fully functioning. Eventually, through menopause (self-replication) and dementia (irritability and dynamic equilibrium) qualities that indicate life may be lost, but the ontological person/soul remains. However, this biological argument is only an empirical way of noticing the deeper biblical ontological reality of the continuing soul/life. That is, the observable congruence samples some evidence of the deeper issue of the consiliance of human personal life.

Within a person there is the cultivation of his awareness of himself as the agent of his own thought and behavior (Kierkegaard, 1941). In other words, the self relates to the person's experience of himself, without the trappings of social facade or presentation, the individual as he stands before himself, as it were, psychologically naked. Thus, self as context or perspective is the primary personal experience.

The blessing of language acquisition is that humans develop a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing and having their experience (Wittgenstein, 1953), and within validating environments, a sense-of-self becomes increasingly under private control. Language allows for a temporal perspective on experience and for the ability to transcend immediacy-the remembered present (Nagel, 1986). Thus ethically, we should make our decisions reflect a gradation which prefers fostering meaningful personhood, especially in the case of conflicting ethical options (Geisler, 1971, pp. 114–138, 1989, pp. 113–133; Kierkegaard, 1967). That is, in conflicting absolutes (which are rare) maximizing personhood (spirituality, relationship, and respect) could provide a guide for identifying higher norms from lower norms. Namely, Love and affirm God (the greatest person) as primary. Love and affirm those with whom you have a more intimate relationship, for it reflects the degree of trust in the covenant (as in marriage) or relationship that you have with them. Prefer the household of faith and those who foster respect. This sort of orientation could even drive a utilitarianism which prefers more persons and complete persons over potential persons (sperm and non-fertilized egg are potential persons and not mere possessions). However, rarely do we have to choose one to the exclusion of the other, because often ethical absolutes do not in fact conflict and with some creativity and faithfulness a way of resolution through apparent conflicts can often be found. Of course, such gradation does not censure self-sacrificing choices, for the others benefit.

However, humans also have the unique ability to over identify with the categories of language (for example, husband, lawyer, father) and become trapped in contrived experiences that occur only in their "mind." When the contrived experiences are associated with dreaded pasts that will not change or futures that have not happened, the individual is the author of their own distress.

The self or soul, in the context of living, is an individual capable of considering his own private and public behaviors before, during and after an event. He is capable of being mindful of the moment in which he is living-his environment, his thoughts and emotions, and his potential responses to them. This self-reflective being develops public and private behaviors both in response to the content of mindfulness and toward mindfulness itself. He can train himself to be either mindful or mindless in the moment with predictable outcomes. Mindlessness or the lack of self-reflective behavior leads to impulsive, habitual behaviors on the one hand and on the other, via the function of verbal behavior, be obsessively "stuck" in catastrophic pasts and futures that do not exist at the moment, either of which can result in ineffective living. Such mindless behavior diminishes consistent ethical thought and praxis.

Implicit in the biblical discussion of the soul or self is the suggestion that the person can only have a self-reflective relationship to himself in context. For example, when attempting to empathize with another person, an individual will experience increasing levels of understanding as he gains more information about the context in which the other lives. Thus, the self is understood in relationship to one's awareness of one's thoughts, feelings and behaviors in response to one's environment, both physical and spiritual. This has significant implications for the person in terms of purpose, meaning and definition.

Conclusion

The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic meaning of "complete living and willing being" in a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Biblically bio-

ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15; Revelation 6:9). Additionally, soul means that animals have certain privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.

Overall Conclusions

Faced with the near unanimity of biblical anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck & Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris. Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) I propose an analysis of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1) "image of God" and (2) "soul." This approach results in a *functionalism*, which I call a *multi-faceted unity.* I propose to extend these biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics for implications. This approach is in contrast to christian bio-ethicists who start from the field of philosophy or biology and tack some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters of their view.

(1) Image of God means "a representation of God" showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974, pp. 160–161; *Tell Fekheriye inscription* 1, 12, 15–16 in Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137); 4Q504 fragment 8, lines 4–6 in Wise , Abegg, & Cook,). God sets the purpose of His image to finitely rule under God's sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play god in bio-ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9).

This legitimates humans attempting prevention and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests (for example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of crops, genetically modified food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, AID, *in vitro*-fertilization, stem cell treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such an image of God concept identifies the theoretically permissible even though I recognize methodologically ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper bring certain restrictions.

In ruling the creation, anything is permitted provided it is: (a) Not excluded by God's command; that is, don't disobey God or He could judge you (Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Anything is permitted provided it fits within God's design parameters and is (c) actively engaged in for the Lord's glory (Romans 14:6–12). (d) Anything wise is permitted, in that it helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e) Anything is permitted that fits within an affirming conscience, rather than violating one's conscience (a New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).

(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic meaning of "complete living and willing being" in a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul means that animals have certain privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.

Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15; Revelation 6:9).

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